4. Infinity and the Sublime by Verelst, Karin
JOURNAL OF
INTERDISCIPLINARY
HISTORY OF IDEAS
2013
Volume  Issue 
Item 
– Section : Articles –
Inﬁnity and the Sublime
by
Karin Verelst
c b n a
JIHI 2013
Volume  Issue 
Section 1: Editorials
. Deuxième anniversaire et un appel à communications
(M. Albertone – E. Pasini)
Section 2: Articles
. Émeric Crucé’s “Nouveau Cynée” (), Universal Peace
and Free Trade (A. Mansﬁeld)
. Crossing Boundaries: Cosmopolitanism, Secularism and
Words in the Age of Revolutions (E.J. Mannucci)
Subsection: Discussions
. Inﬁnity and the Sublime (K. Verelst)
Section 3: Notes
. Doctor of Rivers. On the Remedies for Facing the Fortune
in the Italian Renaissance (S. Mammola)
Section 4: Reviews
. Book Reviews (A. Cavaleo, F. Varallo, E. Pasini)
Section 5: News & Notices
. Activities of the GISI | Les activités du GISI ()
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Inﬁnity and the Sublime
Karin Verelst *
In their recent work, L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor discuss a remarkable connection
between diverging conceptions of the mathematical inﬁnite in Russia and France
at the beginning of the ʰ century and the religious convictions of their respective
authors. ey expand much more on the Russian side of the cultural equation they
propose; I do believe, however, that the French (or rather ‘West European’) side
is more complex than it seems, and that digging deeper into it is worthwhile. In
this paper I shall therefore broaden the path laid out in Graham and Kantor’s
work, by connecting two diﬀerent strands of research concerning the origin of what
I loosely call ‘formal’ ideas: ﬁrstly, the rich but complex relation between logic
and rhetoric throughout European cultural history, and secondly, the impact of
religious convictions on the formation of certain mathematical and scientiﬁc ideas
during Renaissance and Early Modernity, especially but not exclusively in France.
Je pense pour mon compte (…) que
l’important c’est de ne jamais
introduire que des êtres que
l’on puisse déﬁnir complètement en un
nombre ﬁni de mots (Henri Poincaré)
Nommer, c’est avoir individu (Nikolai N. Luzin)
* Vrije Universiteit Brussel (kverelst @ vub.ac.be).
Journal of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas (), , p. :–:. Peer-reviewed.
1. Introduction
e beginning of the ᵗʰ century witnessed a revolution not only in the nat-
ural sciences (Einstein’s special relativity theory and Planck’s quantum of ac-
tion), but also, less well known, in mathematics. Two decades before the turn of
the century an avalanche of discoveries in function theory, topology and num-
ber theory followed the invention of set theory and the (re)discovery of the
astonishing fact that mathematical inﬁnity comes in kinds, even in inﬁnitely
many ones. To these initial groundbreaking steps the name of Georg Cantor,
a German mathematician with Russian roots, is ﬁrst and foremost connected.
Many of the subsequent discoveries belong to a ﬁeld called descriptive set the-
ory and have intuitively to do with what inﬁnite ‘divisions’ (subsets) are possi-
ble of the real numbers line. ey oen have a counter-intuitive, if not down-
right paradoxical, ﬂavour.
Names aached to these discoveries include famous Russian and Polishmath-
ematicians, such as Luzin, Suslin, Sierpinski and Kuratowski, but several noto-
rious French mathematicians, like Baire and Borel, made fundamental contri-
butions¹. However, although working on at ﬁrst glance similar or in any case
related problems, these two groups of men were oen moved by radically dif-
ferent viewpoints on their nature and meaning, and consequently developed
widely diverging approaches with respect to them. It turns out that, while the
Russian mathematicians felt comfortable in the presence of inﬁnite entities,
mathematical or otherwise, their French counterparts rather felt profoundly
disturbed, and feared that the rational nature of mathematical inquiry per se
was at stake. Graham and Kantor discuss in detail the relevance of the diﬀer-
ent intellectual and cultural inﬂuences working on the two main groups during
their most productive phase, and come to the conclusion that these inﬂuences
played a decisive rôle in the development of the mathematics of the inﬁnite,
and more generally, in the evolution of mathematical ideas as a whole:
¹ A readable presentation of the most important issues can be found in Michael Poer, Set eory
and its Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). An excellent discussion of the history
of set theory and of its philosophical implications is Mary Tiles, e Philosophy of Set eory: an
Historical Introduction to Cantor’s Paradise (New York: Dover,  []).
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We believe that our study of French and Russian developments in set theory and the the-
ory of functions points strongly toward the importance of cultural factors in the process
and creation of mathematics—in the French case, Descartes, positivism, and Pascal; in
the Russian case, mystical religious beliefs, particularly those of the Name Worshipping
movement. As a result the French and the Russians followed diﬀerent approaches¹.
ey immediately add that such “intellectual causation” can never be proved
rigorously, only made plausible—and they are evidently right. But it is equally
evident that this holds true for many phenomena investigated in (again loosely
speaking) cultural studies, without making them any less relevant. Graham and
Kantor also point out that comparative studies add up tomore credible evidence,
a point with which I agree.erefore I propose in the present paper an enlarge-
ment of the comparative scope of their work into the past. e question is then
whether their conclusions, with respect to the profound inﬂuence of cultural
factors such as religious convictions on scientiﬁc or mathematical ideas con-
cerning inﬁnity, do still stand. I shall limit myself deliberately to the ‘French’
part of their comparative equation, because they elaborate the French back-
ground only superﬁcially in comparison to the Russian one, probably because
they assume it to be suﬃciently well known. However, what we are familiar
with is the result of a profound cultural transformation, while for our purposes
it is the process leading to it that really maers.
How far in the past do we have to go? e starting point for our investiga-
tion is provided by Graham and Kantor when they state that the French intel-
lectual framework, with respect to “rationalism”, has been shaped decisively by
Descartes and Pascal. is brings us to the beginnings of the modern period, a
time of cultural, religious and scientiﬁc turmoil in thewake of the religiouswars
and the (counter-)reformation that shaered Europe already since more than a
century. Of course this crucial period in European history has been studied by
many from a variety of perspectives, but I do believe that the topic of the math-
ematical inﬁnite, when placed in context and pursued, along its ramiﬁcations,
into other domains of intellectual life, can shed additional light on the deep cul-
tural transformations that shaped the now dominating conceptions concerning
creativity, rationality and the nature of the human mind.
¹ Loren Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor, “A comparison of two cultural approaches to mathemat-
ics France and Russia, -”, Isis , no.  ().
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Exemplary research over the past decades has shown that during the Early
Modern period a debate—really more like an intellectual war—was going on
concerning the nature of rhetoric, and more speciﬁcally centering on the no-
tion of the sublime as a valid source for rhetorical invention. Acceptance or
rejection of the sublime in rhetoric is linked to the belief in an absolute or in-
ﬁnite realm to which a great soul can connect, a belief which has far-reaching
theological consequences and bears upon precise conceptions of the relation
between language, existence and imagination. e sublime paves the way to
the acceptance or rejection of the notion of mathematical inﬁnity. is intel-
lectual connection is quite straightforward and can be shown to shape. e.g.,
certain oppositions between Descartes and Pascal, but I shall show that it re-
mains operative well into the twentieth century, where it explains the diﬀerent
approaches developed to the actual inﬁnite in the foundations of mathemat-
ics by the French rational—heir to Descartes and Port Royal—school (Poincaré,
Lebesgue, Hadamard, Baire, Borel), and by the Moscow school of mathematics
(Egorov, Luzin, Florenskii, Suslin), fueled by a strand of orthodox mysticism
called the ‘Name-worshippers’, who shared a central tenet of the defenders of
the sublime, i.e. that, at least to a certain extent, ‘to name’ and ‘to exist’ coin-
cide¹.
2. Method, Invention and the Sublime
During Renaissance, medieval dialectic as a part of the scholastic tradition
comes under heavy ﬁre, at ﬁrst from the humanistmovement that sweeps through
Europe from Italy (in the ᵗʰ century) to the North (around the end of the ᵗʰ
century). e original criticisms centered mainly on the lack of originality and
the triviality of the seemingly pointless logical nitpicking of the Schoolmen,
their ‘barbaric’ use of Latin and and the overall uselesness of their debates with
respect to civil activity and the real world. is rhetorisation of invention and
¹ Along with the paper already cited, see Loren Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor, “NameWorship-
pers. Russian religiousmystics and French rationalists:Mathematics -”,AmericanAcademy
of Arts and Sciences Bulletin , no.  (). Much more details in Loren Graham and Jean-Michel
Kantor, Naming Inﬁnity. A True Story of Religious Mysticism and Mathematical Creativity (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, ).
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knowledge, fostered by the rediscovery of numerous lost works by ancient au-
thors, implied a ciceronian shi from certain knowledge back to probable. A
second line of aack on the medieval School grew stronger towards the end
of Renaissance—one that focused on ways to acquire true, certain knowledge,
not anymore based on logic, but on observations of the real world formalised
according to a new model for certainty: mathematical quantiﬁcation. is ten-
dency will ultimately prevail and destroy not only the methods of the scholastic
logicians, but also the artistic, rhetorical, even magical approach to reality, so
typical for high Renaissance, forcing art out of science, and giving rise to a new
debate concerning style and literature apparently completely detached from
endeavours to try to understand the world¹.
e divorce of rhetorical invention from dialectical invention depends, ultimately, on an
even more fundamental divorce of rhetoric from dialectic, philosophy, and any of the
scientiﬁc ﬁelds².
We shall see how, dually, diﬀerent choices with respect to inventio appear to
determine the whole intellectual outlook of the individual commied to them.
Maers of ‘style’ can act as light-house ﬁres on conceptual vessels searching for
the metaphysical home ports in which they were constructed, and by means of
which they ought to be construed: “Les questions controversées de rhétorique
(…) jouent donc un rôle déterminant dans l’Europe catholique. Elles témoignent
de préférences qui vont quelquefois jusqu’à des choix théologiques tranchés”³.
is holds true not only for the catholic world, and remains so long aer the
advent of Modernity. I intend to show how conceptions that were rhetorical in
their origin, feeding on metaphysical and even theological grounds continued
¹ Studied in an exemplary manner in Sophie Hache, La langue du ciel. Le sublime en France au
XVII siècle (Paris: Honoré Champion, ). e ﬁnal victory of one of the intellectual parties in
the debate thus brought about the destruction of the other approaches and stood godmother to the
birth of modern science, in its rationalist outlook advocated by Descartes, Leibniz and Pascal, in its
empirist cloak by Newton and his followers. ey all have been relevant with respect to the debate
on the mathematical inﬁnite, as will be discussed in more detail below.
² M. Cogan, “Rudolphus Agricola and the Semantic Revolutions of the History of Invention”,
Rhetorica , no.  (): - ().
³ Marc Fumaroli, L’école du silence. Le sentiment des images au XVII siècle (Paris: Flammarion, 
[]), .
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to inform recent mathematical thought, in particular in France, in a way that
conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Graham and Kantor, but sheds a diﬀerent light on them.
In order to set out the diﬀerent positions in the debate, I focus on the notion
of the sublime, a concept central to early modern controversies on the origin
of rhetorical creativity. e sublime enlarges the sope of human creativity and
surpasses the rule-governed inventio, as if it were a divine breath that infuses
inspiration into the mind, causing a furor or enthusiasm in the mind aﬀected by
it, and allowing it to surpass common boundaries to originality and rhetorical
power. Early Modern writers claimed to have access to such powers: “Je vise
à une plus haute sublimité”¹. It can be retraced to an ancient source, Pseudo-
Longinus’s treatise Peri hypsous (On the Sublime)², the publication of which in
Italy in  from a by then virtually unknown Greek manuscript had, so to
say, dropped a bombshell³.
According to Adrien Baillet, his biographer, Descartes was well aware of the
reality and force of this imaginative enthusiasm:
[Descartes] ne croioit pas qu’on dût s’étonner si fort de voir que les Poètes, même ceux
qui ne font que niaiser, fussent pleins de sentences plus graves, plus sensées, et mieux
¹ Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, Socrate Chrestien (), quoted in Hache, La langue du ciel, .
² Jules Brody, Boileau and Longinus, (Genève: Droz, ).
³ Widely known as De sublimitate, and originally ascribed—erroneously—to the Greek writer
Longinus, it appeared under the title Dionysiou Longinou Peri ypsous logou. Dionysii Longini De
sublimi genere dicendi. In quo cum alia multa praeclare sunt emendata, tum ueterum poetarum uer-
sus, qui confusi commixtique cum oratione soluta, minus intelligentem lectorem fallere poterant, notati
atque distincti (Venetiis: apud Paulum Manutium, Aldi f., ). Its author remains unknown, but
is customary referred to as ‘Pseudo-Longinus’. e history of its rediscovery is exposed in detail
in Marc Fumaroli, “Rhétorique d’école et rhétorique adulte: la réception européenne du Traité du
sublime au XVIᵉ et au XVIIᵉ siècle”, inHéros et Orateurs (Genève: Droz, ), -. J. Brody places
its ﬁrst print in , followed by Hache, La langue du ciel, .
 :  Karin Verelst
exprimées que celles qui se trouvent dans les écrits des Philosophes. Il aribuait cee
merveille à la divinité de l’Enthousiasme, et à la force de l’imagination¹.
However, this possibility of a direct contact between ﬁnite minds and the
divine realm was prone to be considered a blasphemy, and it crumbled under
the rationalising weight of the Reformation, both protestant and catholic, that
sought to eradicate the last traces of ‘paganism’ in all aspects of European cul-
tural life:
Dès lors que l’enthousiasme, soumis à la critique patiente et systématique de l’humanisme
érudit, depuis Jules-César Scaliger jusqu’à Méric Casaubon, n’apparait plus comme le
principe séminal de la connaissance et de l’invention humaines, dès lors que le prin-
cipe de raison s’impose à sa place, ce sont des pans entiers de la culture humaniste qui
s’écroulent, pour faire place à un nouvel édiﬁce de style moderne².
My aim is to show that this decline ultimately had consequences for formal
“arts” like mathematics as well. Many authors on the sublime, Longinus in the
ﬁrst place, stress again and again that its acceptance or rejection in rhetoric is
connected to the belief in an absolute or inﬁnite realm to which a great soul
can connect. It cuts through the frontlines of the notoriouserelle des Anciens
et Modernes, a ﬁerce debate on style and creativity in relation to the sublime in
ᵗʰ century France, that starts with Guez de Balzac and ﬁnds its culmination
in Boileau’s  translation of Longinus’s treatise³. e positions defended in
those debates bear upon precise conceptions of the relation between language,
existence and imagination. is is why the sublime also paves the way to the
possible acceptance or rejection of the notion of mathematical inﬁnity.
In the Peri hypsous Pseudo-Longinus discusses the ultimate source on which
all invention needs to feed in order to get access to truly new, original ideas,
the sublime (το ὑπσος). One can practice to gain access to this source, in spite
of its divine nature, by developing the capacity to master the most vehement
emotions and express them in an appropriately grand style. is should not be
misunderstood as the mere application of a rhetorical technique:
¹ From Baillet’s Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes (), quoted in Michael H. Keefer, “e Dreamer’s
Path: Descartes and the Sixteenth Century”, Renaissance arterly  (), - ().
² Marc Fumaroli, “Le crépuscule de l’enthousiasme”, in Héros et Orateurs, .
³ Hache, La langue du ciel,  ﬀ. and  ﬀ.
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L’un des aspects majeurs développés par les traités de rhétorique s’intéressant au su-
blime est la distinction fondamentale établie entre le style sublime, c’est-à-dire le style
le plus élevé dans la tripartition héritée de la tradition antique, et le sublime, au sens
longinien du terme, qui outrepasse cee hiérarchie et se déﬁnit comme une puissance de
saisissement du discours¹.
It is as if the orator develops a kind of potential participation in the divine
breath into an actual capacity. Longinus calls this exercise explicitly a method²
and he who masters this art has a literally unlimited source of inspiration at
his disposal. He will be able to express everything in the appriopriate way im-
mediately, like a prophet or a seer. Longinus compares its eﬀect with that of a
bold of lightning³.
One of the main instruments to achieve this goal is by the intensive training
of rhetorical memory, heightening it to the level of an almost visionary mental
faculty. During Renaissance, these ancient memory techniques made a forceful
re-appearance on the public scene, but now in the potentially explosive mix-
ture of neo-Platonic natural magic, Hermetism, and their concomiant urge to
expand the powers of the mind. Interest in these mental powers had been res-
urrected already before, by the translation and publication by Marsilio Ficino
of a Greek manuscript containing the main part of the Corpus Hermeticum, or-
dered by Cosimo de’ Medici and published in . us the essential trait of
Renaissance mnemotechnical art was that it became an indissoluble alloy with
magico-religious enthousiasm, which caused a huge and increasingly hostile
respons.
Cee ‘conquète mystique’, qui avait eu plus tôt son pendant en Italie et en Espagne,
fut contemporaine, dans toute l’Europe, d’une véritable obsession de démonologie et de
sorcellerie, et dans les pays protestants, d’une prolifération des sectes d’enthousiastes⁴.
A devastating line of aack against this development was launched by Isaac
¹ Hache, La langue du ciel, . My emphasis.
² De Subl., I, ; Du sublime, ed. Henri Lebègue (Paris: Les Belles Leres, ), -). Right from the
start of his treatise (I, ), Pseudo-Longinus stresses the importance of the acquisition of the correct
techniques to handle the sublime. He calls one who ventures unprepared into this realm améthodos,
unqualiﬁed; see Du sublime, .
³ De Subl.,I, ; Du sublime, -.
⁴ Fumaroli, “Le crépuscule de l’enthousiasme”, .
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Casaubon, who destroyed the historical basis of Ficino’s neo-Platonic natural
philosophy, by demonstrating in  on philological grounds that the Corpus
Hermeticum dated from the Hellenistic period, and not, as Ficino believed, from
times immemorial. A further move, in many respects a decisive one, was made
by his son Meric Casaubon, a professor at Oxford, in , when he published
his Treatise concerning Enthousiasm. He dealt a ﬁnal blow to the credibility of
whatever kind of furor by relocating it into the realm of the pathological¹. is
line of thought was taken up again by his Cambridge colleague Henry More,
a Platonist of the rationalist kind, in his book A brief discourse of the nature,
causes, kinds and cure of Enthusiasm².
e Renaissance up to the end of the ᵗʰ century is characterised by an emerging con-
ﬂict between the humanism of Ciceronian controversia and the newer expressions of a
platonizing tendency to restore dialectic as the fundamental intellectual discipline. is
conﬂict comes out clearly in the debates between Erasmus and Luther, which pit a view
of rhetoric that is basically bilateral and symmetrical and that aims at the satis probabile,
against a view like Plato’s, where the Truth is to be communicated eﬀectively in a uni-
lateral, asymmetrical seing. (…) Eventually, the humanistic controversialist rhetoric
gave way, ﬁrst, to the platonizing Ramists and, aerward (…) to the empiricists’ and
Cartesians’ (…)³.
Especially access through memory to the Lullian dignitates Dei or names or
properties of God⁴ under the form of symbolic images, created a forceful reac-
¹ He plays therefore a key rôle in the shi from bodily to mental normality, as it has been described
by Foucault in his Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (Paris: Plon, ).
² It is well known that Newton as a young student was an avid reader of his work. See John
Henry, “Henry More and Newton’s Gravity”, History of Science  (), -. It is relevant to our
concerns to point out that More discusses how God’s tituli precisely serve as an indication of the
abyssal gap between Him and his creation.is discussion clearly inﬂuenced Newton when writing
his General scholium to the Principia. For an analysis of the textual relationshiop, see: Rudolf De
Smet and Karin Verelst, “Newton’s Scholium Generale. e Platonic and Stoic Legacy: Philo, Justus
Lipsius and the Cambridge Platonist”, History of Science  (), -.
³ omas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
), -.
⁴ Ramón Lull, a contemporary to omas Aquinas, developed an astonishing ‘Art’, the aim of
which was to organise all knowledge on the basis of a meditation on the names of God (the Dig-
nitates Dei). ere are nine fundamental names of God organised in triads (goodness, greatness,
eternity…), which form a kind of ladder of being along which the ‘artista’ ascends and descends. At
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tion from calvinist and puritan sides. ey called upon Ramus’s imageless di-
alectical theory of memory as an alternative for the mnemotecnical “idolatry”.
e puritan theologian W. Perkins even called for an absolute prohibition of
the use of images as an aid to the mind. But also catholics who stood under the
inﬂuence of Augustinianism, like the Jansenists, were very critical. eir com-
mon concern is the desire to purify Christianity from all remnants of paganism:
“C’est sous l’inﬂuence d’un augustinisme plus soucieux de trancher entre pa-
ganisme et christianisme, entre nature et grâce, que (…) la notion d’inspiration
enthousiaste (…) se verra menacée même dans le domaine rhétorique et poé-
tique”¹.
Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole were two Port-Royal theologists who
more or less strongly adhered to Jansenism². Jansenist theology is Augustinian
by inspiration and marked out by strong resemblances to several Protestant
tendencies. But Arnauld and Nicole are also the authors of the so-called Port
Royal Logic, the original title of which is: La Logique, ou l’art de penser³. Already
the ﬁrst page of the ﬁrst chapter of the Logique contains a reference to St. Au-
gustine. It evidently ﬁts in the reform-movement we outlined before, together
with other aempts to revolutionise the ‘art of thought’, like Johann Clauberg’s
Logica Vetus et Nova (), which might have been one of its sources of inspi-
ration⁴.
the same time they ground a memory system organised by means of combinatory wheels laying
out the interconnections that everything in creation entertains with the aributes of the Creator.
¹ Fumaroli, “Crépuscule”, .
² And so did Pascal. See Jean-Pierre Chantin, Le jansénisme (Paris: Cerf, ); Louis Cognet, Le
Jansénisme (Paris: PUF,  []).
³ Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l’Art de Penser, ed. Pierre Clair and François
Girbal (Paris: Flammarion,  []).
⁴ See the introduction to Johann Clauberg, Logique Ancienne et Nouvelle, ed. Jacqueline Lagrée and
Guillaume Coqui (Paris: Vrin, ).
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is very inﬂuential and widespread book outlines an anti-Aristotelian con-
ception of logic based on the study of natural language and on the nature of
mathematical deductions (as opposed to merely syllogistic ones), and it states
explicitly that the authors chose their examples in such a way as to introduce
the reader to the correct philosophy of nature, as well as to correct methods
for judgment in maers moral and religious. Arnauld and Nicole heavily stress
the importance of both simplicity and ‘good sense’ in judgment, and lay this
down in eight ‘Rules’ destined to govern the process of reasoning. ese are
exempliﬁed in the atrième partie. De la méthode, the last part of their book.
ey furthermore distinguish carefully between analyse, the method of inven-
tion, and synthèse, the method of composition¹. Finally, they declare explicitly
that in this respect they are followers of Descartes in his Discours de la mé-
thode. e example was followed by Newton², who starts the third Book of his
Principia—not accidentally named aer another work by Descartes, the Prin-
cipia Philosophiae³—with a notorious set of (diﬀerent!) “Regulae philosophandi”,
rules of an empiricist inspiration to which scientiﬁc practice should comply in
order to lead to trustworthy new results⁴.
e principal innovation brought by Arnauld and Nicole is the distinction
between a thing and its representation, like a word and the thought that it ex-
¹ Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, .
² Newton had a copy of the latin translation of the Port Royal Logic in his personal library: Logica,
sive Ars cogitandi: in quae praeter vulgares regulas plura nova habentur ad rationem dirigendam utilia.
E tertia apud Gallos editione recognita et aucta in Latinum versa (Londini: Impensis Richardi Green,
). In the Harrison catalogue of Newton’s library, this is item . I have reasons to believe it had
been given or pointed out to him by his friend Nicolas Fatio de Duillier.
³ A link evident to his contemporaries, as witnessed by Huygens in a leer to Leibniz of May
 , where he refers to the “raisonnement et experiences de Newton dans ses Principes de
Philosophie”; see Leer , in Oeuvres Complètes de Christian Huygens (La Haye: M. Nijhoﬀ, 
ﬀ.), X, . On the relation between Newton and Descartes see, e.g., Andrew Janiak, Newton as
Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
⁴ e genesis of Newton’s “rules” is problematic in itself and deserves far more aention than it
usually gets. A notable exception is I. Bernard Cohen, “Hypotheses in Newton’s Philosophy”, Physis
 (), -. Interesting observations with regard to the diﬀerent versions of the start of Book III
of the Principia in ScoMandelbrote, Footprints of the Lion: Isaac Newton atWork (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Library,  (the catalogue of an exhibition held there). An interesting study of
scope and aim of Newton’s empiricism as voiced in their ﬁnal version is: Alan E. Shapiro, “Newton’s
Experimental Philosophy”, Early Modern Science and Medicine , no.  (), -.
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presses: “les mots sont des sons distinctes & articulés, dont les hommes ont fait
des signes pour marquer ce qui se passe dans leur esprit”¹. is seemingly inno-
cent statement marks the fundamental breach with the past: even though dis-
position, style, and delivery are method-governed disciplines, the characteristic
proper to inspired discourse is that the word and the thing it represents disap-
pears: “Le sublime (…) abolit la béance entre présence at représentation”². As
Foucault points out appropriately³, this separation of words and things marks
out the transition from the ᵗʰ to the ᵗʰ century, and will be part and parcel
of any modern liguistic theory: “Ainsi le signe enferme deux idées: l’une de la
chose qui représente; l’autre de la chose représentée”⁴. But Arnauld and Nicole
operate their distinction in a much larger sense, so as to separe cause and eﬀect
in natural phaenomena, or even in theology, like the symptomes of an illness,
ot the stigmata of the suﬀering Christ. A judgment concerning something is
then a proposition consisting of this subject and a praedicate. Starting from
this analysis, they defend a new method for invention based on logic to deduce
new ideas. e conception of logic they defend is anti-Aristotelian in the sense
that it is based on mathematical deductions as opposed to syllogistic ones.ey
evidently have geometry in mind, which remains aer all, as far as proofs are
concerned, “an exercise in Logic, classically”⁵. Why then geometry, instead of
pure logic? Because of a problem that had been pointed out, among others, al-
ready by Descartes, and which has been summed up nicely by J. Henry: “e
trouble with ‘reason’, as was clear from the fact that both Calvinists and Papists
could claim it for their side, was that it could be made to subserve virtually any
cause”⁶. Geometry, by virtue of the fact that it has a proper content related
to facts of nature, seemed to be a more reliable guided to certainty than the
subtleties of controversial disputation. Arnauld and Nicole then, predictably,
¹ Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, .
² Fumaroli, “Réception”, .
³ See the second chapter of Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences
humaines (Paris: Gallimard, ).
⁴ Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, .
⁵ David Finkelstein, “Maer, Space and Logic”, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
(), -; repr. in e Logico-Algebraic Approach to antum Mechanics II, ed. Cliﬀord A.
Hooker (Dordrecht: Reidel, ), .
⁶ John Henry, “e Scientiﬁc Revolution in England”, in e Scientiﬁc Revolution in National Con-
text, ed. Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), .
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proceed in Part III to a critical discussion of the “lieux”, the traditional loci or
common places that were in use to structure rhetorical memory.
Arnauld is also co-author of a Grammaire générale et raisonnée contenant les
fondemens de l’art de parler, expliqués d’une maniére claire et naturelle¹ which
essentially claims that the basic structures of language are simple, innate and
universal². e separation of mentalities can be gauged from the fact that C.
Favre de Vaugelas, co-founder of the Académie and one of the main editors of
its Dictionnaire, published only ﬁeen years before his Remarques sur la langue
française, utiles à ceux qui veulent bien parler et bien écrire, of which the cen-
tral tenet was that the best way to master the French language was to copy
the ways of speech—“le bon usage”—of the members of the royal court. is,
again, is intimately connected to the debate on ‘style’ that ravaged the French
République des leres in the same period, where the tendency towards a tamed,
christianised version of the sublime found its ally in the growing preference
for a ‘natural’, ‘elegant’, ‘simple’ discourse, claimed to constitute the génie de la
langue française.
For Meric Casaubon, the poetically transgressing ‘inspired’ mind is nothing
more than a pathological mind, vulnerable to the ruses of paganism. True judg-
ment requires nothing but ‘bare speech’ to expose ‘the true nature of things’.
Words are nothing but representations, the mental face of sensible things. us
a conceptual line links the in origin Aristotelian conception of words as sym-
bola rerum defended by both Scaliger and Casaubon, directly to Locke’s Essay
on Human Understanding (). Indeed, nobody will be surprised to ﬁnd that
it contains a critique of enthousiasm which insists on the lack of proof for the
pretenses to certain knowledge that any uerance grounded in it could claim.
On the other hand, Henry More succesfully ridicules the melancholic temper-
aments unable to discriminate between a bodily aﬄiction and the workings of
God’s grace³.While the English Aristotelians and later empirists thus succeeded
¹ Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot, Grammaire générale et raisonnée (Paris: Editions Allia,
 [, ³]).
² e work inspired Chomsky in the development of his ‘generative grammar’, which he himself
qualiﬁes as a part of a wider approach to language, ‘Cartesian linguistics’; see Noam Chomsky,
Cartesian Linguistics: a Chapter in the History of Rationalistic ought (New York: Harper and Row,
).
³ Fumaroli, “Crépuscule”, .
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in eﬀectively abolishing any credible remnants of the ‘inspired’ forms of knowl-
edge to the extend that all activity involving possible errants into l’irrationnel,
l’inspiration, la dictée ‘démonique’—even philosophy—became suspect, the al-
liance between simplicité and le sublime was to shape what René Bray was to
call “la doctrine classique”, that gracious philosophical “art de converser” in ur-
ban life in France’s -ᵗʰ centuries. Even the detractors of rhetorics had to put
their cause eloquently! During that period, the debate on the nature of the sub-
lime will resurface, but now within the safe conﬁnes of the domain of the arts,
in the modern sense of that word.e alreadymentionederelle des Anciens et
Modernes was to oppose the great French dramatists Racine and Corneille, the
writers Perrault and Guez de Balzac¹. And Boileau, author of a De l’art poètique,
and, as we have alreadymentioned, the ﬁrst translator of theDe Sublimitate into
French, used the laer as a couterpoise to the ᵗʰ century Aristotelian Julius
Scaliger’s pedantic criticisms of any inspired rhetoric². is evacuation of phi-
losophy into the realm of literature went at the cost of its immediate connection
to and relevance for reality, whether mundane or sublime: imagination became
a sphere of life disconnected from ‘science’ as it was practiced in laboratories
or at the theorist’s writing desk:
Car les contraintes psychologiques et même physiques qu’exerça la reforme de l’Eglise—
du côté protestant comme du côté catholique—ne furent que de peu inférieures à celles
exercées par la Révolution francaise à son apogée ou—mutatis mutandis—par la révolu-
tion soviétique. (…) A un moment donné, la censure avait transformé la personnalité :
les gens avaient perdu l’habitude d’utiliser activement leur imagination et de penser par
‘qualités’, car cela n’était plus permis. La perte de la faculté d’imagination active entraîna
forcément avec elle l’observation rigoureuse du monde matériel et celle-ci se traduisit
par une aitude de respect pour toute donnée quantitative et de soupçon envers toute
assertion d’ordre ‘qualitati’³.
When the gates of the soul ﬁnally closed on the sublime as a road to ulti-
mate reality, the way was free for a strictly rational account of the function-
ing of the human mind in its relation to the world. Both the empirists and the
¹ As already pointed out, this querelle is studied in detail in Hache, La langue du ciel. See also Marc
Fumaroli, La erelle des Anciens et des Modernes (Paris: Gallimard, ), -.
² See Fumaroli, “Crépuscule”, .
³ Ioan P. Couliano, Eros et Magie à la Renaissance (Paris: Flammarion, ), .
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Cartesio-Leibnizian rationalists are holding the same line with respect to this,
be it armed with very diﬀerent argumentive weaponry. Style becomes a facet
of the ﬁrst person in the small sense—the birth of the subject, so to speak—and
the birth of the idea that debates are a maer of mere literature and personal
opinion, as the querelle between the seventeenth century French literary lumi-
naries makes abundantly clear. e question of knowledge belongs from now
on to an entirely diﬀerent realm. e empirists evacuate the question of the
sources of knowledge to the outside world, and reduce it to the relation between
that world and the sensual impressions we receive from it. is approach will
be epitomised in the Regulae Philosophandi by which the mature Newton starts
Book III of the Principia. e clearest example of the nature of the periods’ con-
cern withmethod, however, is Leibniz, who explicitly links the trustworthliness
of his caracteristica universalis to the exhaustive success of his ars inveniendi,
based as it is on a mechanical procedure to come to new and true propositions.
And they all are deeply indebted to Descartes’s ideas.
We have by now reached the point were the ‘French side’ of the story of
Graham and Kantor begins. Let me compare this shortly to the description they
oﬀer of the mental and cultural background of the Russian mathematicians, and
its eﬀect on their dealing with inﬁnity.
3. When Existence is in a Name
During the spring of , the Russian navy aacked the monasteries on
the peninsula of Athos in order to destroy a Christian-orthodox heresy that
had been condemned shortly before by the synod of St. Petersburg. More than
 monks were arrested and imprisoned. What was the nature of this heresy,
and why did it call for such a violent reaction? Its roots go back to a problem
that had haunted theology since centuries: the question whether God can be
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known, and if not, how He can be worshipped¹. In the Western or Latin church,
answers to this question had been provided along two diﬀerent lines: that God
is to a certain extend rationally knowable through His creation, but at the same
time, as far as His mysterious nature is concerned, He remains out of reach
for mortal minds, and one can trust only on faith, as revealed in Scripture and
transmied by the Church. Claims to any more direct access to His nature in
mystical experience had been tolerated, but looked upon with suspicion, for
they posed a threath to the authority of the Church. e consequences of this
ambivalence had stirred Christianity in its foundations already in the thirteenth
century, when it developed into the theory of double truth², which held that if
reason proved something to be true, while its contrary was a maer of faith,
then both would retain validity. e initiators of this school of thought were
mainly Aristotelian masters at the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris,
known as ‘Latin Averroists’. On an opposite stance,omas Aquinas developed
his magistral Summa eologica. But too sharp a division between reason and
faith was at odds also with the neo-Platonic currents feeding Christianity since
late Antiquity, a fertile soil on which mystical tendencies using music, poetry,
and meditation techniques had ﬂourished throughout the Middle Ages.
During the Reformation period, the chasm between revealed and discovered
truth will deepen and it will eventually play an important part in the debates
that brought to Galilei’s  condemnation³. Nevertheless, at both sides of the
gap there was agreement on the need to reject and even persecute religious
‘enthousiasts’ of all stripes, but especially the rapidly spreading millenarian
Protestant sects like the ‘French Prophets’. ey believed they could communi-
cate with the deity directly through possessions, including visions, prophecy,
and trances, induced by dancing and music. ey belonged to a bigger group
of radical Protestants, the Camisards, who had been violently oppressed since
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (). In  a group of refugees lead by
¹ is is in fact a variation on Meno’s knowledge paradox, presented by Plato in the dialogue
bearing the same name: how can one learn what one does not know, given the fact that one does
not know one does not know it?
² Étienne Gilson, “La doctrine de la double vérité”, in Études de philosophie médiévale (Strasbourg:
Faculté des Leres de l’Université de Strasbourg, ), -.
³ Luca Bianchi, Pour une histoire de la “double vérité” (Paris: Vrin, ). See the Préface for an
overview.
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Elie Marion arrived in London, where they met again with oppressive authori-
ties. Notwithstanding that oppression, they continued to exert lasting inﬂuence
through their writings. Marion hadwrien a treatise on prophecy, Les Avertisse-
ments prophétiques¹, which laid the basis for the later Shaker movement². But
in Britain their inﬂuence was stamped out by the combined eﬀorts of the An-
glican church and the philosophical empiricists, who had been taking over the
intellectual lead from the rational Aristotelians of the former generation.
We thus see that, even though inspired movements of all kinds had been
present and even dominating throughout large parts of European cultural his-
tory, their public inﬂuence ceased to exist almost completely aer, say, ,
at both sides of the Channel, save for the literary credibility they retained in
France. is had immediate consequences for philosophy in its large sense.
Descartes starts his Regulae with the remark that people tend to think wrongly
that they can conclude validly on the basis of some merely particular similarity
(similitudo) between things that otherwise diﬀer³. We mentioned already that
Foucault points out that the correction of this ‘error’ marks the transition from
ancient to modern with respect to linguistics. We showed how Arnauld and
Nicole (inspired as well by Pascal) elaborate this distinction into a full-ﬂedged
theory of representation. In the Cartesian framework, ‘likeness’, as well as any
other mental operation that involves a leap of the imagination, has its place
only in philosophy or literature, not anymore in science. Furthermore, in the
ﬁrst book of his Principia philosophiae, Descartes states clearly that, since we
are ﬁnite beings, it would be absurd to hope we might ever understand the in-
ﬁnite, and it therefore be beer to not think of it at all. He explicitly refers to
¹ Jean-Paul Chabrol, Elie Marion, le vagabond de Dieu - (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, ).
² is Marion had been a close friend of Fatio de Duillier, himself a close friend of Newton’s at
least until the mid s. See Loup Verlet, La malle de Newton (Paris: Gallimard, ), . Newton
himself has wrien extensively on the intepretation of prophecy, and his method with respect to
this relates closely to the methods he developed in his scientiﬁc works.is has been researched ex-
tensively in Maurizio Mamiani, “To Twist the Meaning: Newton’s Regulae Philosophandi Revisited”,
in Isaac Newton’s Natural Philosophy, ed. Jed Z. Buchwald and I. Bernard Cohen (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, ), -; Id., “Newton on Prophecy and the Apocalyps”, in e Cambridge Compan-
ion to Newton, ed. I. Bernard Cohen and George E. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
), -.
³ René Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Texte critique, ed. G. Crapulli (La Haye: M. Nijhoﬀ,
), . See also the Adam and Tannery edition of the Oeuvres de Descartes: AT X, .
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mathematical problems, like whether there are inﬁnite lines, and whether their
halves are inﬁnite aswell; whether there are inﬁnite numbers, and if so, whether
they are even or odd, etc. In order to solve such questions, you need an inﬁnite
mind. ey are incomprehensible to us to the same extent as the mysteries of
the Incarnation and of the Trinity, which he discussed in the paragraph before.
It is worthwhile to give the full quotation:
Ita nullis unquam fatigabimur disputationibus de inﬁnito. Nam sane, cum simus ﬁniti,
absurdum esset nos aliquid de ipso determinare, atque sic illud quasi ﬁnire ac compre-
hendere conari. Non igitur respondere curabimus iis, qui quaerunt an, si daretur linea
inﬁnita, ejus media pars esset etiam inﬁnita; vel an numerus inﬁnitus sit par anve inpar,
et talia: quia de iis nulli videntur debere cogitare, nisi qui mentem suam inﬁnitam esse
arbitrantur¹.
For us, ﬁnite minds, when confronted with something of which we can con-
ceive no end, the only viable strategy is to consider it as indeﬁnite, i.e., ﬁnite, but
without a conceivable end. In contemporary terms: all arguments we develop
in mathematics are ﬁnitary, even if they deal with ‘the inﬁnite’.
Nos autem illa omnia, in quibus sub aliqua consideratione nullum ﬁnem poterimus in-
venire, non quidem aﬃrmabimus esse inﬁnita, sed ut indeﬁnita spectabimus².
He then gives inﬁnite extension and the inﬁnite divisibility of maer as ex-
amples of problems which we can only think of in ‘indeﬁnite’ terms. ‘Inﬁn-
ity’ is a name we can apply to God alone: “tum ut nomen inﬁniti soli Deo re-
servemus”³. We can, however, know that there are inﬁnite things— eternity,
God—without understanding them, because without them, it would not even
be conceivable for a ﬁnite mind to have the idea of inﬁnity at all. In a certain
sense, our ﬁnitude points towards the inﬁnity of God, making it accessible to
our knowledge, but keeping it far out of reach from our comprehension. ere
are many other places in Descartes’s work where he varies on this basic idea:
“our reason, our powers of comprehension are ﬁnite and limited, and since the
will’s decisions are determined by reason, we have no, so to speak, immedi-
ate access to inﬁnity. We have to content ourselves with recognizing inﬁnity
¹ AT VIII, -; Principia, I, .
² AT VIII, .
³ Ibid.; Principia, I, .
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without being able to explain it”¹. is in fact comes down to the Aristotelian
diﬀerence in degree of reality between ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ inﬁnity, which
are generated ‘stepwise’ and ‘at once’ respectively². e cautious aitude with
respect to actual inﬁnity was shared by Huygens and even by Newton in his
mature life³. Pascal’s introduction of the principle of induction in his Traité du
triangle arithmétique (), seems at ﬁrst to jeopardise this line of events. But
evidently, to establish his induction principle, Pascal uses arguments based on
indeﬁniteness, not inﬁnity, in the sense of Descartes⁴. Moreover, Pascal had
warned against epistemological pretenses: even though inﬁnities exist, they re-
main inﬁnitely far beyond the limits of comprehension of the human mind⁵.
So there is much more direct evidence to Descartes’s and Pascal’s stance with
regard to inﬁnity than the meager quotation on Descartes’s reductionism Gra-
ham and Kantor oﬀer on p.  of their book. We also see more clearly by now
in what philosophical and religious context they should be placed.
Be that as it may, according to them, this is the intellectual aitude that, al-
most three centuries later, hampered the French mathematical community in
¹ For this paraphrase and an elaborate discussion in reference to AT III,  and II, , see A.
Drozdek, “Descartes: Mathematics and Sacredness of Inﬁnity”, Laval théologique et philosophique
, no.  (), -.
² Tiles, e Philosophy of Set eory, .
³ Once again, Newton’s aitude is peculiar and ridden with apparent inconsistencies. A case in
point is the mathematical methodology of the Principia, which is deliberately based on the old ge-
ometrical methods, while he had his theory of ﬂuxions already at his disposal. is was part of
an ideological agenda to promote ‘ancient wisdom’ as superior over the modern one; see James
E.Force, “Newton, the ‘Ancients’ , and the ‘Moderns’”, in Newton and Religion: Context, Nature, and
Inﬂuence, ed. James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, ), -. e implica-
tions this had for Newton’s mathematics are brilliantly analysed in Niccolò Guicciardini, Reading
the Principia, e Debate on Newton’s Mathematical Methods for Natural Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, , []).
⁴ Henri Poincaré showed in his  paper “Les mathématiques et la logique”, that complete in-
duction thus construed involves either a petitio principii—the set of all natural numbers—, or a
circularity—the principle of complete induction itself. e paper has been published in several
pieces and variants; I used the annotated reprint in Poincaré, Russell, Zermelo et Peano. Textes de
la discussion (-) sur les fondéments des mathématiques: des antinmies à la prédicativité, ed.
Gerhard Heinzmann (Paris: Blanchard, ), -.
⁵ Cfr. the famous passage no.  on the ciron (mite) in the Pensées. Arnauld andNicole elaborate this
“problem of inﬁnity” along Pascalian lines in the ﬁrst chapter of the fourth part (“De la méthode”)
of their Logique,  ﬀ.
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its aempts to deal with Cantor’s set theory and its concomiant arithmetic of
inﬁnity¹. Cantor had proven in  that the set of natural numbers, or the inte-
gers, and the set of real numbers, had diﬀerent types of inﬁnity of elements, and,
even more, that there is an inﬁnite number of types of inﬁnity, which he called
‘transﬁnite’ cardinal numbers. He then set out to check whether there are other
inﬁnities lying in between the two basic arithmetical inﬁnities, and formulated
his famous Continuum Hypothesis (CH), which basically states that this is not
the case. Although he never succeeded in proving CH—nobody ever did—he did
prove in  the remarkable result that CH holds for all closed subsets of the
real line. is kind of investigation had ancient antecedents in the paradoxes of
Zeno, and had been problematised before by Bolzano in his Paradoxien des Un-
endlichen. Interestingly, one of the early defenders of Cantor’s work in France
was the mathematician and historian of mathematics and philosophy Paul Tan-
nery. He introduced in the modern literature the idea that set theory and the
paradoxes appearing in it should be related to the work of Zeno². e problem
was pinned down accurately in  by yet another prominent French mathe-
matician, Henri Lesbesgue (famous for his work on integration theory), when
he entered the discussion on another set theoretic source of antinomies, Zer-
melo’s axiom of Choice: “La question revient à celle-ci, peut nouvelle: peut-on
démontrer l’existence d’un être mathématique sans le déﬁnir? (…) déﬁnir à tout
le temps le sens de: nommer une propriété du déﬁni”³. is is just another way
¹ e following sketch is based on Graham and Kantor, Naming Inﬁnity, -.
² Poincaré was of the same opinion: “il est arrivé qu’on s’est heurté à certains paradoxes, à cer-
tains contradictions apparentes, qui auraient comblé de joie Zénon d’Elée et l’école de Mégare”;
Henri Poincaré, Science et Méthode (Paris: Kimé,  []), . If one renders Zeno’s two fun-
damental paradoxes in what I call their canonical form (as a paradox of plurality: to consist of
parts with and parts without magnitude, and a paradox of motion: to count the uncountable), then
the family resemblance with the modern set theoretic paradoxes (Burali-Forti, Russell,…), becomes
easily visible. See Karin Verelst, “Zeno’s Paradoxes. A Cardinal Problem. I. On Zenonian Plural-
ity”, in Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects. Proceedings of the First International
Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication, ed. Gordana Dodig Crnkovic and Susan Stuart
(Riga: University of Latvia Press, ). For Tannery’s ideas on the subject, see Paul Tannery, “Le
concept scientiﬁque du continu. Zénon d’Elée et Georg Cantor”, Revue philosophique de la France
et de l’étranger  (), -. One will remark that this is a philosophical, not a mathematical
journal. It might be worth considering that Tannery is (together with Charles Adam) also the editor
of the famous critical edition of Descartes’s complete works.
³ In a leer to Borel published in Jacques Hadamard et al., “Cinq leres sur la théorie des ensem-
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of saying that one has to restrict mathematical notions to those which can be
clearly deﬁned in a ﬁnite number of words and for which a consistent mental
representation is present, requirements which sound familiar in an intellectual
environment shaped by Descartes and Port Royal.
Even though French interest in Cantor’s results was almost immediate, it was
relegated largely and for a long time to the realm of philosophy. When three of
the most noted French mathematicians decided (already in ) that it would
be worthwhile to translate Cantor’s work, they appointed the task to a Jesuit
priest, because “[Cantor’s] philosophical turn of mind will not be an obstacle
for a translator who knows Kant”¹. In , E. Picard, an important member
of the French mathematical establishment, nearly dismissed René Baire’s doc-
toral dissertation on discontinuous functions. Baire had, albeit in a very careful
way, used concepts of set theory in the theory of functions. Evidently, such a
speculative subject witnessed the twists of a philosophical mind: “L’auteur”, so
Picard, “nous paraît avoir une tournure d’esprit favorable à l’étude de ces ques-
tions qui sont à la frontière de la mathématique et de la philosophie”². is was
not an innocent remark, nor meant as a compliment.
Even Borel, who invented Borel sets (a way to divide the real line that has
a speciﬁc algebraic structure) and founded measure theory, and who was as a
young mathematician captivated by both the person and the work of Cantor,
declared that he had been carried away by Cantor’s romanticism³, and took
some distance; as Jean-Michel Kantor summarizes it, Borel wouldmaintain: “We
are serious people; this at least is not philosophy; a disagreement can only be
due to a misunderstanding”⁴.
bles”, Bulletin de la S.M.F.  (), - (-).
¹ “Leur tournure philosophique ne sera pas un obstacle pour le traducteur qui connaît Kant”,
Charles Hermite’s leer to Miag-Leﬄer, quoted in Graham and Kantor, Naming Inﬁnity,  and
.
² oted in Loren Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor, “A Comparison of Two Cultural Approaches
to Mathematics: France and Russia, -”, Isis , no.  (), - ()
³ “J’ai été extrêmement séduit, dès l’âge de  ans, par la lecture des travaux de Cantor. (…) Georg
Cantor a apporté dans l’études des mathématiques cet esprit romantique qui est l’un des côtés les
plus séduisants de l’âme allemande”; quoted in Graham and Kantor, “A Comparison”, .
⁴ Loren Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor, “Name Worshippers. Russian Religious Mystics and
French Rationalists: Mathematics -”, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin ,
no.  (), .
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Cantor’s ideas had indeed ﬂourished in late ᵗʰ century romantic Germany,
but even there Cantor had faced problems throughout his career, because of the
staunch opposition to his work by an inﬂuential group of mathematicians led
by L. Kronecker, who declared in explicitly theological terms, that “God made
the integers; all else is the work of man”¹. Both Cantor and Baire suﬀered a
nervous breakdown as a consequence from themental strain caused byworking
on such problems, as well as the burden it put on the development of their
respective academical careers. Cantor ended up in a mental asylum, and Baire
commied suicide, thus complying to Meric Casaubon’s curse in one of those
ironical twists history seems so fond of to play on us.
How diﬀerent the reception of these ideas was in Russia can be gauged from a
remark of an initiator of the Russian school of mathematics, which contributed
somuch to their further elaboration: “Everything seems to be a daydream, play-
ing with symbols, which however, yield great things”.is note was not wrien
by an exalted artist, but by one of the greatest Russian mathematicians of the
ᵗʰ century, Nikolai N. Luzin². Graham and Kantor explain this diﬀerence by
the cultural inﬂuence dominant in Russia during the end of the ᵗʰ and the
beginning of the ᵗʰ century. We are not going to reproduce here in extenso
their analysis —I refer to the book and the various papers mentioned in the
footnotes—but let us summarize their conclusions, and link them to the bigger
historical context we outlined above. In the cultural realm of the Eastern (Greek
and Russian) Orthodox churches, nothing comparable to the extinction of reli-
gious enthousiasm had happened until much later, not incidentially during the
period of Russia’s forced modernisation, started by the Czarist regime in the
second half of the ᵗʰ century. e use of exalted symbolism had been com-
mon practice in Orthodox liturgy for ages, e.g. in iconography, but especially
the use of the controversial ‘Jesus Prayer’, a ritual in which the worshipper
“chants the names of Christ and God over and over again (…) until his whole
body reaches a state of religious ecstasy in which even the beating of his heart,
in addition to his breathing cycle, is supposedly in tune with the chanted words
‘Christ’ and ‘God’”³.
¹ Eric T. Bell, Men of Mathematics (New York: Simon and Schuster, ), .
² oted in Graham and Kantor, “A Comparison”, .
³ Graham and Kantor, “A Comparison”, .
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It had roots in practices going back to fourth century monastic hermits in
the Near East, and caused already in the ᵗʰ century a theological controversy
with the more rationalistic Byzantine tradition. ose practicing it were called
“Name Worshippers”; those opposing the practice “anti-Name Worshippers”.
e conﬂict came to a climax in a politically highly sensitive period (the im-
pending collaps of the Ooman Empire and the recent Menchevik Revolution)
when in  Ilarion, a monk from a Russian monastery on Mt. Athos, pub-
lished a very popular book entitled In the Mountains of the Causasus, in which
he claimed that the fact that the faithful can reach a state of unity with God by
chanting his name proves that the name of God is holy in itself, that the name of
God is God. Interestingly enough, he stresses that the process required to learn
to do the prayer eﬀectively takes years and has to follow certain methodolog-
ical steps. With his claims, he provoked a line that no monotheistic theology
can aﬀord to be trespassed, and condemnation followed swily, which led to
the events cited at the beginning of this section¹.
Now this strand of exalted theology exerted a direct inﬂuence on the mathe-
matical developments in Russia through a former mathematician turned Ortho-
dox priest, P. Florenskii. Two of the founding members of the Moscow school
of mathematics, D.F. Egorov and N.N. Luzin, who would become leading math-
ematicians in the twenties and thirtees with major contributions to descriptive
set theory and the theory of discontinous functions, were among Florenskii’s
disciples. Florenskii was an adept of the Name Worshippers, and he defended
his ideas on several occasions during meetings of a small circle of followers in
Egorov’s appartement. He sought to bring together mathematics and religion
through the concept of “naming”, as it had been understood by the Name Wor-
shippers: “to name something was to give birth to a new entity. (…) Humans
could exercise Free Will and put in perspective mathematics and philosophy”².
Set theory was the ﬁeld par excellence wherein the mathematical power of
naming came to full fruition: discontinuity and inﬁnity became amaer ofmen-
tal creativity instead of nervous breakdown. Luzin and Egorovwere not witheld
by the constraints that halted Lebesgue.ey fully developed the concept of ‘ef-
¹ A report on the revolt at Mt. Athos and details on the larger historical background can be found
in the ﬁrst chapter of Graham and Kantor, Naming Inﬁnity.
² Graham and Kantor, “A Comparison”, .
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fective set’ or ‘named set’, introduced by Lebesgue in  as a tool to avoid the
inconveniences of the Axiom of Choice. According to Graham and Kantor, the
birth of descriptive set theory coincides with the moment in  on which M.
Suslin, a student of Luzin’s, entered his oﬃce to show a mistake he discovered
in a proof by Lebesgue concerning projections of Borel sets on the real line.e
famous Polish topologist W. Sierpinski witnessed the scene¹. Sierpinski’s own
work would lead later on to another ﬁeld infested by discontinuity and inﬁnity,
the theory of fractals. Luzin was convinced that properly naming a mathemat-
ical object was the key to many profound mathematical problems. We can now
beer understand the moo with which this paper started. us, Luzin’s work
is the fulﬁlment of the project outlined by Florenskii: “the naming of sets was
a mathematical act, just as the naming of God was a religious one, because the
point where divine and human energy meet is ‘the symbol’, which is greater
than itsel”².
But this leaves us with a seeming historical paradox. In his book on the sym-
bolic revolution in -ᵗʰ century Europeanmathematics, M. Serfati has shown
beyond a shadow of doubt that the “de-rhetoricalisation” of mathematics and
its increasing “symbolisation” go hand in hand³. It is nevertheless clear that
the Russian use of symbols is kin to that tradition that we have sketched, that
favours the use of the imagination as a source of creativity, i.e. the rhetorical
tradition. How can these two developments of the use of symbols be matched?
We have no intention to go into this question in any detail here, but let us sug-
gest the outlines of a putative answer. Apparently, in the Russian case there
is another source of emancipation of the symbol at work, with a very diﬀer-
ent cultural origin. e emancipation of the symbol is not linked to its being
puriﬁed from any pre-existing content referring to a “chose”—a something—in
the sense of the early algebrists, as described brilliantly by Serfati in his book.
We suggest that, for the Russians, symbols act like emblems, the existence of
which is as much a condition for the existence of what they “symbolise” as it
is the other way around. is is conﬁrmed by the way Graham and Kantor un-
¹ Ibid., .
² Ibid., .
³ M. Serfati, La révolution symbolique. La constitution de l’écriture symbolique mathématique (Paris:
Pétra, ).
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derstand the Russian way to resort to the use of symbols: “Symbolism is the
use of a perceptible object or activity to represent to the mind the semblance of
something which is not shown but realised by association with it”¹.
Evidently, this is generally not the way we construe the operation of mathe-
matical symbols. We do agree, however, that this is exactly what the Russians
had in mind: nommer, c’est avoir individu. Symbols play a diﬀerent rôle in the
two approaches—the rationalistic and the imaginative one. In the ﬁrst, symbols
are representations of something else, even a ‘no-thing’. In the second, sym-
bols are signs that not simply “re-place” something, but they take place instead
of the thing in the place of which they stand, a semiotic rather than a seman-
tic relation, a co-incidence rather than an arbitrary union. e messenger in a
certain sense is the master speaking out directly².
Il faut que ce soit quelque chose de céleste et d’inspiré qui intervienne dans l’éloquence
pour exciter les transports et les admirations qu’elle cherche. (…) Il est besoin de quelqu’autre
que de l’art, aﬁn que la spéculation se rende sensible, et qu’elle tienne ce qu’elle a promis.
Aﬁn que les règles deviennent examples, aﬁn que la connaissance soit action et que les
paroles soient des choses³.
4. Conclusion
Cultural diﬀerences and transformations do not only aﬀect the way we think
about the world, but also the way in which we conceive of our mental faculties.
e comparative study by Graham and Kantor seems to indicate that a ‘leap of
imagination’—in the traditional sense—is needed in order to be able to reach out
for certain kinds of formal ideas. We believe the historical research presented
in this paper conﬁrms their ﬁndings at least to a certain extend. is promi-
nent rôle of, literally, imagination, even when not recognised as such for want
of relevant cultural reference points, sheds another light on the tenacity of the
¹ Graham and Kantor, “A Comparison”, .
² e mechanism of the coincidence between a person preaching on supply and his master has
been studied in Aubrey R. Johnson,e One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God (Cardiﬀ:
University of Wales Press, ), especially with respect to the workings of prophecy.
³ J.-L. Guez de Balzac, Paraphrase ou de la grande éloquence, cited by M. Fumaroli, “Réception”, .
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infamous “Platonism” which is rumoured to be so popular among practicing
mahematicians, to the despair of philosophers of mathematics and logicians
alike. It might well be that such type of conviction, no maer how ﬂawed in
itself, is a condition of possibility for doing certain types of mathematical in-
quiry at all. e dual probably also holds, but it remains a dual, not an inverse
relationship.
Evidently, this paper is just a ﬁrst and sketchy aempt to deal with this sort
of question. In this speciﬁc case, in order to be complete, a detailed study of
the philosophical and rhetorical sources of orthodox Christianity would have
been needed as well. But I believe nevertheless to have shown that there are
some remarkable parallells between themental universes inwhich sects like the
“Name-Worshippers” and the Early Modern “enthusiasts” operate. is again
rendersmore clearwhy the destruction of these enthousiast tendencies through-
out the European (Counter-) Reformation has had such a marked impact not
only on mathematical invention and the place of imagination in philosophy,
but on science in general. is line of research widens the scope of existing
interpretations of these cultural phenomena: the transition from extatic Re-
naissance culture into the much more restrained Early Modern civilisation did
not only transform forms of knowledge, but also aﬀected the psychology of
the knowlegde-bearer. It moreover points to some further, potentially interest-
ing research projects, like a re-assesment of the mathematics implied in the
diagrammatic representations interspersed throughout the works of Giordano
Bruno, or a re-evaluation of the philosophical and theological sources of Can-
tor’s ideas on inﬁnity, developed as they were in a Germany outliving the Ro-
mantic reaction against the excesses of Reformatory Enlightenment, as well as,
say, Grothendieck’s reﬂexions— in the ﬁrst part of Récoltes et semailles—on “Le
Reveur”, his source of inspiration, during the period of the beat-generation and
the ensuing psychedelic revolution in the West.
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